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ESSAY 
GUILT: HENRY FRIENDLY MEETS THE 
MaHaRaL OF PRAGUE 
Irene Merker Rosenberg* 
and Yale L. Rosenberg** 
In 1970, when for a brief moment in time federal collateral review 
was broadly available for both federal and state prisoners, 1 Henry J. 
Friendly, "the preeminent appellate judge of his generation,"2 ques-
tioned whether innocence had become irrelevant in the litigation of 
constitutional claims in federal habeas corpus.3 Advancing finality, 
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and our colleague, David Dow, for his thoughtful comments. Our special thanks to Chaya Blaut 
and to Rabbi Yitzchok Adlerstein, Professor of Judaic Studies at the Yeshiva of Los Angeles. 
1. The modem expansion of federal habeas corpus began in 1953 with Brown v. Allen, 344 
U.S. 443 (1953), making the remedy generally available to state prisoners pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 (1988). In 1963, a banner year for federal habeas, the Court broadened § 2254 in three 
important decisions: Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), authorizing petitions by state prisoners 
who had committed procedural defaults unless they had deliberately bypassed state procedures 
for vindicating their federal constitutional claims; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), requir-
ing full and fair evidentiary hearings for petitioners who had not received them in state court; 
and Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), downplaying finality concerns for federal prison-
ers ma.\ing successive motions for relief under the companion provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
(1988), and making clear that the same rules would govern state prisoners. The final expansion 
was in 1969, when the Court held that Fourth Amendment claims could be asserted under 
§ 2255. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969). Rolling back federal habeas, the Court 
in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), discussed infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text, 
effectively barred Fourth Amendment claims by state prisoners. Even before Stone, Davis v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), had held that federal prisoners who failed to object to the 
composition of the grand jury by appropriate motion under the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure could not make that claim under§ 2255. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-91 (1977), 
substantially enlarged the Davis exception, rejecting Noia's reasoning with respect to all trial-type 
defaults in state court and holding that procedural defaults preclude habeas corpus relief absent 
showings of cause and prejudice. Noia was completely overruled in Coleman v. Thompson, 111 
S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991). Other recent decisions have curtailed federal habeas corpus still fur-
ther. See infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. See also LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVIC· 
TION REMEDIES§§ 19-21 (1981 & Supp. 1987) for a historical overview of federal habeas corpus. 
2. Wilfred Feinberg, In Memoriam: HenryJ. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1713 (1986). 
For a collection of such accolades, see Pierre N. Leval, Henry J. Friendly - In Memory of a 
Great Man, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 571, 572 n.2 (1986). 
3. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 
U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970). 
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frivolity, and floodgate concerns, 4 he argued that, with certain excep-
tions - such as challenges to "the very basis of the criminal pro-
cess"5 - prisoners seeking collateral relief should be required to make 
a colorable showing of innocence. Under Judge Friendly's formula-
tion, the petitioner would have to demonstrate "a fair probability that, 
in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally 
admitted ... , the trier of the facts would have entertained a reason-
able doubt of his guilt."6 The effect of the proposal would be to ex-
clude from federal collateral attack most nonguilt-related 
constitutional claims,7 and in particular Mapp 8 and Miranda 9 exclu-
sionary rule violations. 
Two decades later, it is clear that the probability that a habeas 
petitioner in fact committed the crime is not merely relevant but often 
dispositive as a basis for denying relief. Indeed, going well beyond 
remedies, the issue of factual guilt now pervades American criminal 
constitutional law, 10 often in ways that do not rest comfortably along-
side the Bill of Rights' guarantees limiting government power in the 
criminal justice process. 
Factual guilt affects federal habeas corpus primarily in two ways. 
First, in accord with Judge Friendly's recommendation, 11 the entire 
class of Fourth Amendment claims has virtually been barred as 
nonguilt-related, 12 a potentially omnivorous rationale. 13 Second, with 
4. Id. at 142-51. 
5. Judge Friendly enumerated four exceptions to the innocence requirement: (1) attacks re-
lating to "the very basis of the criminal process," such as lack of counsel; (2) claims grounded on 
evidence outside the record and thus not considered on appeal; (3) attacks based on state failure 
to provide a "proper procedure for making a defense at trial and on appeal," such as not permit-
ting a prior determination of the voluntariness of a confession before its consideration by the 
jury; and (4) contentions stemming from new constitutional developments given retroactive ap-
plication, such as double jeopardy claims. Id. at 151-54. 
6. Id. at 160 (footnote omitted). Judge Friendly's definition would allow the federal habeas 
petitioner to argue for the exclusion of unreliable evidence, including evidence unconstitutionally 
obtained, and for the inclusion of evidence that was improperly excluded or that became avail-
able only after trial. Id. 
7. Id. at 160-61. "[T]he exclusionary rule is a bonanza conferring a benefit altogether dispro-
portionate to any damage suffered." Id. at 161. 
8. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
10. See infra notes 12-33 and accompanying text. 
11. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The majority in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 
(1976), discussed infra note 12 and accompanying text, cited the Friendly article in support of its 
ruling. See 428 U.S. at 480 n.13, 489 n.27, 491 n.31. 
12. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 481-82 (precluding Fourth Amendment claims in federal habeas 
corpus as long as there was an opportunity for full and fair litigation thereof in state court). 
13. The rationale of Stone seemingly authorizes the elimination of whole subject matter areas 
from the federal habeas jurisdiction whenever the implicated constitutional right is not guilt-
related. 428 U.S. at 489-91. So far, however, the Court has refused to extend Stone in this 
manner. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559-64 (1979) (claim of racial discrimination in 
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respect to other allegations of unconstitutionality, some showing of 
innocence is a prerequisite to availability of relief if the petitioner has 
defaulted in state court14 or has filed any previous federal writs15 or 
has asserted a claim that is not based squarely on existing precedent.16 
Not merely in the foreground, factual guilt, along with federalism and 
finality, is now one of the dominant themes of federal habeas corpus. 17 
This ascendancy of innocence has not, however, been limited to 
collateral attacks. It is becoming increasingly important in direct re-
view as well, 18 affecting the substantive content of constitutional 
grand jury selection cognizable in federal habeas); see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 
413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (responding to the dissent of Chief Justice Burger by argu-
ing that the question of extending Stone to Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims was not properly 
before the Court). 
14. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), required the defaulting state prisoner to show 
cause for the default and prejudice resulting therefrom. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 
(1982), defined prejudice to require a showing by petitioner that the constitutional error "worked 
to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 
dimensions." 456 U.S. at 170. Because the evidence of homicide was overwhelming and Frady 
had not substantiated his claim that he had acted without malice, the Court concluded that there 
was "no risk ofa fundamental miscarriage of justice." 456 U.S. at 171-74. In Murray v. Carrier, 
477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986), the Court clarified this miscarriage of justice standard, stating that 
"in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the convic-
tion of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the 
absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default." 
15. See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), redefining the successive petition require-
ments of Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), and holding that second or successive writs 
filed by habeas petitioners will be deemed an abuse of the writ absent showings of cause and 
prejudice or proof of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The Court defined the terms "preju-
dice" and "miscarriage of justice" in the manner described supra note 14. McClesky, 111 S. Ct. 
at 1470-74. 
16. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), held - with two narrow excep-
tions - that claims based on a "new" rule would not be applied retroactively to cases on collat-
eral review. The second of these exceptions was with respect to cases announcing new 
procedural rules that were both " 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' " and "without 
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." 489 U.S. at 311, 313 
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissent-
ing)). Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990), made it clear that most habeas claims would 
involve new rules, defining that term to include any contention concerning which reasonable 
judges might differ. 110 S. Ct. at 1217-18. 
17. Federalism and finality are the primary policy rationales that the Court has offered for 
severely restricting federal collateral review. See, e.g., Teague, 489 U.S. at 309-10 (1989) (plural-
ity opinion); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982). The Justices have been willing, however, 
to relax such restraints if the petitioner demonstrates some likelihood of innocence. See supra 
notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
18. In this respect the Court has gone well beyond Judge Friendly's proposal to make inno-
cence relevant in habeas. Indeed, Judge Friendly acknowledged that innocence "may continue to 
be largely [irrelevant] on direct appeal." Friendly, supra note 3, at 172. In a similar spirit of 
doing the creator one better, the Rehnquist Court adopted the recommendation in Justice 
Harlan's concurring opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971), that habeas 
be available for the litigation of new claims only if the asserted procedural rights were necessary 
to assure fundamental fairness implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, but added the require-
ment that the likelihood of an accurate conviction would be seriously diminished absent the 
right. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-13. 
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rights, the circumstances in which their violation will be excused, and 
the applicability of barriers to their adjudication. 
The Justices have infused the guilt-innocence issue into the very 
substance of Bill of Rights' guarantees in various ways. Assertions of 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, for ex-
ample, require a showing of prejudice, that is, a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's incompetence, the outcome would have been 
different. 19 Similarly, availability of the due process right to counsel at 
a probation or parole revocation hearing turns in part on whether the 
petitioner can make a "colorable claim" that she has not violated the 
terms of parole or probation.20 
In addition to including innocence as a specific element of the con-
stitutional safeguard, the Court often looks to that factor in determin-
ing the proper breadth of a right. The less guilt-related a right, the 
more likely its interpretation will be narrow. This phenomenon is ap-
parent in the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule case law,21 and it 
also influences the continuing constriction of the scope of the amend-
ment itself, subsumed under the rubric of effective law enforcement.22 
Indeed, the Court has stated explicitly that innocence of the accosted 
person is a factor in determining whether there was a seizure within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.23 On the other hand, the Jus-
tices seem unconcerned that their approval of new and not necessarily 
reliable police techniques such as drug courier profiles may subject 
19. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In her majority opinion, Justice 
O'Connor stressed that the reviewing court, in its determination of prejudice, must consider the 
totality of the evidence; thus "a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is 
more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support." 466 
U.S. at 696. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall objected to the ruling because, inter alia, 
it rested on the theory "that the only purpose of the constitutional guarantee of effective assist-
ance of counsel is to reduce the chance that innocent persons will be convicted." 466 U.S. at 711. 
Cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 391 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (questioning 
whether "the admission of illegally seized but reliable evidence can ever constitute 'prejudice' 
under Strickland"). 
20. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (creating a good faith exception 
to exclusionary rule for officer relying on defective warrant, and referring to "inherently trust-
worthy tangible evidence"). 
22. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1989-91 (1991) (expanding automobile 
exception to warrant requirement, based in part on alleviating confusion of police officers that 
may impede law enforcement); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237-38 (1983) (stating that prob-
able cause may be established by totality of the circumstances because a more stringent rule 
interferes with effective police investigations). 
23. See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991), the bus sweep case, in which the 
majority said, "We ... reject ... Bostick's argument that he must have been seized because no 
reasonable person would freely consent to a search of luggage that he or she knows contains 
drugs. This argument cannot prevail because the 'reasonable person' test presupposes an inno-
cent person." 
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innocent persons to unwarranted stops.24 Nor has the Fifth Amend-
ment been unaffected by this concentration on guilt. As Justice 
O'Connor noted in a decision facilitating waivers of Miranda rights, 
admissions "are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, 
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law."25 
Similarly, the Court is contracting constitutional protection by us-
ing factual guilt defensively, as a means of expanding the scope of 
rules that inhibit consideration or application of constitutional rights. 
Doctrines such as harmless error,26 inevitable discovery,27 and im-
peachment,28 which in effect excuse or partially excuse constitutional 
violations, as .well as barriers to adjudication such as standing29 and 
24. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Reflexive 
reliance on a profile of drug courier characteristics runs a far greater risk than does ordinary, 
case-by-case police work of subjecting innocent individuals to unwarranted police harassment 
and detention. This risk is enhanced by the profile's 'chameleon-like way of adapting to any 
particular set of observations.' "). 
25. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986). The Court also held that police deception 
of defendant's attorney was not sufficiently egregious to constitute a due process violation. 475 
U.S. at 432-34. 
26. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court ruled that constitutional error 
did not require reversal of the conviction if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice 
Black noted that harmless error rules "serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting 
aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed 
the result of the trial.'' 386 U.S. at 22. Although the Chapman Court suggested that some 
errors, such as admission of coerced confessions, could never be harmless, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8, in 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991), five Justices concluded that harmless error analy-
sis was also applicable to involuntary confessions. Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the 
"harmless error doctrine is essential to preserve the 'principle that the central purpose of a crimi-
nal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence.' " 111 S. Ct. at 
1264 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). 
27. In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the Court held that physical evidence obtained 
in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel nonetheless could be used at trial if the 
police could establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged information would 
in any event have been discovered by lawful means. Chief Justice Burger observed that a con· 
trary view "fails to take into account the enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the search 
for truth in the administration of justice.'' 467 U.S. at 445. 
28. For instance, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), concluded that statements ob-
tained in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach a defendant who testified on his own 
behalf at trial. 401 U.S. at 226. The Harris majority viewed the impeachment process as helpful 
to the jury in assessing the credibility of the accused and stressed that defendants who testify 
have no right to commit perjury. 401 U.S. at 225-26. 
Thus, although a confession obtained in violation of Miranda may not be used as evidence in 
the case in chief, the violation is partially excused when use of the statement is permitted for 
impeachment purposes. 
29. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), although purporting to eschew standing analy-
sis, the Court decided that passengers in an automobile could not object to the search of its glove 
compartment and passenger seat because they had no expectation of privacy in those portions of 
the vehicle. The holding therefore precluded the Court from determining whether there was a 
lawful basis for the stop and search. The broad rationale underlying the restriction was that 
[e]ach time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindica-
tion of Fourth Amendment rights .... [Thus,] misgivings as to the benefit of enlarging the 
class of persons who may invoke that rule are properly considered when deciding whether to 
expand standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations. 
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consent,30 arguably are responses to concern over freeing the guilty. 
The ultimate barrier preventing courts from reaching the merits of 
constitutional claims - a restriction premised in large part on the 
guilt of the accused31 - is of course the rule that voluntary guilty 
pleas constitute waivers precluding defendants from asserting most an-
tecedent constitutional violations. 32 This prohibition, in conjunction 
with the high percentage of guilty pleas, masks the extent to which the 
Constitution may leave improper police investigatory techniques and 
other official misconduct unregulated. 33 
Taken together, these doctrines severely impede application of con-
stitutional rights. They also reinforce the Court's substantive dilution 
of constitutional guarantees as well as its evisceration of federal reme-
dies for their vindication. Cumulatively, all these substantive, proce-
dural, and remedial restraints, which are based in whole or in part on 
considerations of factual guilt, have seriously undermined the consti-
tutional balance struck by the Bill of Rights. 
While the Court has rather freely insisted on colorable claims of 
innocence as a means of preserving convictions of the guilty, pepper-
ing its opinions with graphic descriptions of the crime and the defend-
ant's connection to it,34 the Justices have seemed less in touch with the 
439 U.S. at 137-38 (footnote omitted). But see Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990) (over-
night guest has expectation of privacy in the home in which he is staying). 
30. Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), determined that consent to a search 
could be voluntary even though the defendant had not been advised of his right to refuse permis-
sion, and that such waiver was to be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. 
A finding of consent legitimizes a search, even if the police did not have probable cause or a 
warrant. Justifying this result, the majority emphasized that "the community has a real interest 
in encouraging consent, for the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and 
prosecution of crime, evidence that may ensure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly 
charged with a criminal offense." 412 U.S. at 243. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990), 
expanded the consent doctrine, ruling that if the police reasonably, albeit mistakenly, believed 
that a third party had authority to consent to search of a home, the resulting search was 
reasonable. 
31. In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 773 (1970), the Court held that a plea of guilty 
constitutes a waiver of the right to attack the voluntariness of defendant's confession, and noted 
that defendant was "convicted on his counseled admission in open court that he committed the 
crime charged against him." Cf North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding that an 
express admission of guilt is not a constitutional requirement for acceptance of a guilty plea and 
imposition of punishment, at least where there is factual support for the plea). 
32. Sei! Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 
(1970); Parkerv. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). But see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 
(1975) (double jeopardy claim not waived by counseled guilty plea). 
33. It is estimated that up to 90% of all criminal convictions are obtained by guilty pleas. 
See, e.g., DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNO-
CENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966). Thus, the likelihood that unconstitutional action will go un-
detected is very high. 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 155 (1982) ("Inside Bennett's house, 
police officers ... found ... blood-spattered walls. Thomas Bennett lay dead in a pool of blood. 
His neck and chest had suffered horseshoe-shaped wounds from the metal heel plates on Frady's 
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converse principle, namely, assuring acquittal of the innocent or less 
culpable. Although the reasonable doubt standard has been constitu-
tionalized, 35 and requires the prosecution to establish each material 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, this standard has 
yielded to federalism considerations. States now may conflate degrees 
of criminality,36 permitting, for example, the punishment of man-
slaughterers as if they were murderers, and they may shift burdens 
with respect to defenses that define culpability, such as requiring de-
fendants accused of murder to prove self-defense. 37 
The cognate concept of the presumption of innocence, which pre-
vents punishment prior to conviction, has fared no better. In Bell v. 
Wolfish, 38 which upheld body cavity searches and other intrusions on 
incarcerated persons awaiting trial, the Court redefined39 this pre-
sumption as merely a "doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in 
criminal trials ... [but] has no application to a determination of the 
rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has 
even begun."40 Similarly, in upholding the constitutionality of preven-
tive detention against due process and Eighth Amendment bail claims, 
the majority elevated the legal consequences of indictment while strip-
ping the presumption of any substantive vitality.41 
Given its preoccupation with law and order, the Rehnquist Court's 
leather boots and his head was caved in by blows from a broken piece of a tabletop .••• One of 
Bennett's eyes had been knocked from its socket."). 
35. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Relying on Winship, the Court in Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), held unconstitutional jury instructions creating a mandatory pre-
sumption with respect to a material element of the crime. Sandstrom thus reinforces Winship by 
requiring that juries be permitted to resolve issues of fact relating to material elements of the 
crime. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986), undercut Sandstrom by making violations thereof 
subject to harmless error analysis. Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991), however, established 
stringent requirements for finding a Sandstrom error to be harmless. 
36. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (state not permitted to shift burden of 
proving heat of passion to defendant accused of murder) with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 
197 (1977) (no violation of Winship for state to shift burden of proving extreme emotional distur-
bance to defendant charged with murder). 
37. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987). See also Irene M. Rosenberg, Winship Redux: 
1970 to 1990, 69 TEXAS L. REv. 109, 120 (1990) (footnote omitted) (noting that the result in 
Martin means that "the state may punish as a murderer one who may have killed in self-
defense"). 
38. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
39. Compare Bell with Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (finding that bail set higher than 
necessary to assure presence at trial is excessive under the Eighth Amendment and noting that 
"(u]nless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only 
after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning"). 
40. 441 U.S. at 533. Contra 441 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Prior to conviction 
every individual is entitled to the benefit of a presumption both that he is innocent of prior 
criminal conduct and that he has no present intention to commit any offense in the immediate 
future." (footnote omitted)). 
41. United States v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). In Salerno the majority upheld the pre-
ventive detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. In his dissenting opinion Justice 
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emphasis on factual guilt, at least as a ground for upholding convic-
tions, is hardly unexpected. Nonetheless, even the present majority 
has wavered occasionally between establishing standards that assure 
conviction of the guilty and adhering to rules that prevent 
prosecutorial or police overreaching regardless of the defendant's cul-
pability. The Justices, for instance, have expanded Miranda protec-
tion for suspects in custody who have invoked their right to counsel, 42 
and have required that police officers legitimately on the premises es-
tablish probable cause even for minimal inspections of items in plain 
view,43 although these categories of claims are usually unrelated to 
factual guilt. Such straying, however, often provokes admonitions 
from the true believers. For example, in Powers v. Ohio 44 the Court 
held that a prosecutor's use of the state's peremptory challenges to 
exclude otherwise qualified jurors on the basis of their race violated 
equal protection and that the defendant had standing to raise the ex-
cluded black jurors' claims even though he was white. Dissenting to-
gether with the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia accused the majority of 
reprising Miranda: 45 "[T]he Court uses its key to the jail-house door 
not to free the arguably innocent, but to threaten release upon the 
society of the unquestionably guilty unless law enforcement officers 
take certain steps that the Court newly announces to be required by 
law."46 
In short, the factual guilt credo has limitations. Even its foremost 
enthusiasts have never suggested either that the Bill of Rights is 
merely hortatory or that all constitutional guarantees are conditioned 
on showings of innocence. That the Constitution expresses at least 
Marshall noted the relationship between the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt 
standard: 
Our society's belief, reinforced over the centuries, that all are innocent until the state has 
proved them to be guilty, like the companion principle that guilt must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'' and is established beyond 
legislative contravention in the Due Process Clause. 
481 U.S. at 763 (citations omitted). 
42. Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 492 (1990). But see McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. 
Ct. 2204 (1991) (holding that an invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a 
bail hearing does not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel derived from Miranda, and 
that therefore confession obtained through police-initiated questioning of jailed suspect with re-
spect to another charge was admissible in evidence). 
43. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). Justice Scalia's majority opinion noted "nothing 
new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order 
to protect the privacy of us all." 480 U.S. at 329. Justice Scalia premised his decision on the 
language of the Fourth Amendment. Where such textual support is in his view missing, Justice 
Scalia is likely to emphasize instead the question of factual guilt. See infra text accompanying 
notes 44-46. 
44. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). 
45. 111 S. Ct. at 1381 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
46. 111 S. Ct. at 1381 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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some values that transcend guilt and innocence may be regretted, but 
it has never been doubted.47 
The constitutional safeguards governing the criminal process may 
be viewed as an extension of the long common law history of eviden-
tiary rules and privileges, many of which deflect accurate factfinding.48 
In Anglo-American jurisprudence, a criminal trial is concerned pri-
marily, but not exclusively, with adjudication of guilt. Unrelated but 
important societal concerns often affect the outcome. Over the centu-
ries, we have protected marital,49 spiritua1,so and medical51 relation-
ships because in general we have considered them to be more 
important than determining guilt in individual cases. The Bill of 
Rights, much of which is derived from English law, 52 embodies yet 
another set of values that are intimately related to the criminal process 
and that define the relationship between the government and the gov-
erned. The desire to protect this spectrum of interests in the criminal 
adjudicative process impinges on the need to assure punishment of 
47. See, e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311, 320 (1990) (holding that the prosecution 
could not use illegally obtained statements of the defendant to impeach the credibility of a de-
fense witness, and noting that "various constitutional rules limit the means by which government 
may conduct [the] search for truth in order to promote other values embraced by the Framers 
and cherished throughout our Nation's history."). 
48. With respect to privileges: 
Their effect ... is clearly inhibitive; rather than facilitating the illumination of truth, they 
shut out the light . 
. • . Their warrant is the protection of interests and relationships which, rightly or 
wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some sacrifice of availabil-
ity of evidence relevant to the administration of justice. 
KENNETH s. BROUN et al., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 72, at 171 (Edward w. Cleary, 3d ed. 
1984) (footnotes omitted). 
49. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43, 53 (1980) (acknowledging the "an-
cient roots" of spousal privilege, but refusing to permit defendant in criminal case to invoke it to 
prevent testimony of spouse willing to do so, and ruling instead that "the witness-spouse alone 
has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely"); People v. Fields, 328 N.Y.S.2d 542 (App. Div. 
1972) (reversing conviction because based in part on privileged spousal communication). See 
generally 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2332-33, at 642-45 (John T. McNaughton, 
rev. ed. 1961) (discussing history and policy of the marital communications privilege, and refer-
ring to policy underpinning that "the injury that would inure to [the relationship] by disclosure is 
probably greater than the benefit that would result in the judicial investigation of truth"). 
50. See generally W1GMORE, supra note 49, §§ 2394-95, at 869-77 (although priest-penitent 
communications not privileged at common law, such a privilege has been recognized by statute 
or judicial decision in two thirds of the states); id. § 2396, at 878 ("Would the injury to the 
penitential relation by compulsory disclosure be greater than the benefit to justice? Apparently it 
would."). 
51. See, e.g., People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738, 742-45 (Cal. 1983) (reversing conviction 
because, inter alia, trial court's admission of testimony violated defendant's psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege). See generally WIGMORE, supra note 49, § 2380, at 818-20 (while rejected at 
common law, the privilege for physician-patient communications has been adopted by two thirds 
of the states, where it "is a settled part of the law"). But see id. § 2380a, at 830 ("The injury to 
justice by the repression of the facts of corporal injury and disease [due to invocation of the 
privilege] is much greater than any injury which might be done by disclosure."). 
52. See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES passim (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959). 
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wrongdoers. s3 
The resulting tension between factual and legal guilt is thus not a 
new problem. Any legal system that does not depend on summary 
justice must come to grips with this issue, and the more elaborate the 
rules governing determination of guilt and the more attenuated such 
rules are from factual guilt, the harder the problem. 
We have never been moved by the Court's emphasis on innocence 
as a precondition to constitutional relief. Factual guilt has always 
seemed elusive. s4 The best one can do in a criminal trial is to approxi-
mate truth, and only rather grossly at that. ss Ascertaining factual 
guilt through a dry appellate record is more slippery still. s6 The safe-
guards in the Bill of Rights, on the other hand, represent this coun-
try's historical view of what is essential to prevent government 
oppression and to assure accuracy, fairness, and just punishment in 
the criminal process. s7 Linking factual guilt and constitutionality is 
53. Although there may be remedies other than exclusion of evidence at the criminal trial, 
such as civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 
168-72 (1961), administrative quasi-judicial proceedings, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 
and administrative rulemaking by police, see, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court 
and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. RE.v. 785, 810-15 (1970), we question 
the effectiveness of these alternatives, none of which speaks to the issue of judicial integrity. See 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961), and discussion infra notes 109-11 and accompanying 
text. 
54. As our colleague David Dow has noted: 
"Guilt" is a term of art. It does not mean that the defendant "did it,'' for that statement 
would raise difficult, perhaps unanswerable, epistemological questions in many, though not 
all, cases .... What we really mean by "guilt" is that a jury of the defendant's peers believed 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did it .... This legal idea of guilt is simply not 
the same as the question of whether the defendant "did it," for the legal category acknowl-
edges that in many cases it is, as a matter of epistemology, impossible to answer with cer-
tainty the question of whether he "did it." 
David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital 
Defendants, 19 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 301, 317-18 (1991). 
55. See Richard M. Markus, A Theory of Trial Advocacy, 56 TuL. L. REV. 95 (1981). Mar-
kus states: 
A trial presents selected witnesses who recite selected portions of their respective memories, 
concerning selected observations of the disputed event .... 
. . . Manifestly, the recited data are a fraction of the remembered data, which is a frac-
tion of the observed data, which is a fraction of the total data for the event. 
Id. at 97-99. 
56. See Justice Marshall's dissent in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): 
On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to 
ascertain how the government's evidence and argumen~ would have stood up against rebut-
tal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer. The difficulties of estimating 
prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the de-
fendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the incompetence of defense 
counsel. 
466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
57. But see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural 
Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 705-10 (1990) (stating that the 
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one way of effectively diminishing the Bill of Rights without directly 
addressing whether we as a polity should do so, and that appears to be 
what is happening now to the Fourth Amendment.58 Notwithstand-
ing its role as the countermajoritarian branch in our constitutional 
scheme, the Court has embraced the political branches' manipulation 
of public concern over crime, correlating constitutional protection 
with wrongdoing and making Mapp and Miranda the fall guys for the 
crack epidemic. 
As proverbial card-carrying ACLU members, we give primacy to 
constitutional limitations on state power. For us, McCarthyism was 
not merely an aberrational excess. And as Jews, both our history and 
our law make us wary of venerating factual guilt and sacrificing proce-
dural rights in the process. Our history is res ipsa: it teaches us to be 
cautious when government flexes its police power. Our law represents 
a triumph of legal guilt, a complex superstructure of rules whose viola-
tion necessitates dismissal of criminal charges regardless of the defend-
ant's apparent culpability.59 Jewish law offers a striking contrast to 
the Supreme Court's blossoming love affair with factual guilt as a basis 
for preserving judgments of conviction. 
To be sure, Jewish law may be considered irrelevant to American 
constitutional analysis, separated as the two systems are not only by 
millennia, but by religious, cultural, social, and economic differences. 
In fact, Jewish and American criminal jurisprudence arguably start 
from different premises. Among the underlying assumptions in Jewish 
criminal law are that the human courts must operate within strict con-
straints designed to assure absolutely reliable determination of guilt, 60 
and that in any case of acquittal of the factually guilty, God will ulti-
argument for collateral review of nonguilt-related defaulted claims on the basis of their symbolic 
value is wrong because it denies that there is a hierarchy of constitutional rights). 
58. The assault on the Fourth Amendment has come from many directions. To mention 
only a few, the Warrant Clause has been significantly restricted, see, e.g., United States v. Wat· 
son, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrants not required for routine arrests in public); the probable cause 
requirement has been diluted, see, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (substituting a 
"totality of the circumstances" test for determining probable cause); the category of permissible 
stop and frisk situations has been expanded, see, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) 
(permitting protective search of automobile interior based on reasonable suspicion); the exclu· 
sionary rule has been limited, see, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (evidence 
obtained by officers relying in good faith on defective warrant is admissible); the definition of a 
seizure has been narrowed, see, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (invalidating per 
se prohibition on evidence garnered by police who randomly boarded bus and asked passengers 
for permission to search luggage); and courts have increasingly used the balancing test, and, as a 
result, have more frequently upheld administrative or regulatory searches. See, e.g., New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (upholding school official's search of student's purse if reasonable 
under all the circumstances). 
59. See generally HAIM COHN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEWISH LAW 208-16, 225-30 (1984) (dis-
cussing panoply of procedural and legislative safeguards in the Jewish criminal process). 
60. See infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text. 
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mately assess culpability correctly and completely and punish accord-
ingly. 61 That American law does not accept an omniscient and 
omnipotent God as the ultimate enforcer or backstop does not, how-
ever, preclude comparison of the two legal systems. This country is in 
many ways religiously oriented, and, in any event, moral and ethical 
beliefs, which surely pervade our society, may provide a roughly 
equivalent deterrent to wrongdoing and an underpinning for the no-
tion that evil is its own retribution. 
Furthermore, the differences between Jewish and American law 
should not obscure their similarities. After all, the purpose of both is· 
to set normative standards of social conduct that everyone is required 
to obey. Like its American counterpart, Jewish law seeks to deter 
wrongdoing, as exemplified by the Biblical refrain, "all Israel shall 
hear, and fear," which accompanies particular punishments and legal 
requirements.62 Indeed, Jewish law is a fundamental building block of 
Western civilization. Consciously or not, the United States has 
adopted basic concepts of Jewish criminal procedure, such as double 
jeopardy,63 the privilege against self-incrimination,64 notice, and the ex 
post facto prohibition. 65 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has re-
ferred to Jewish law in support of some of its most important rul-
ings. 66 Finally, notwithstanding their differences, both systems 
address the core concern of dealing properly with those accused of 
crime, and both set up rules limiting and canalizing the criminaliza-
tion process. Jewish law does so as a religious imperative; American 
61. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
62. See Deuteronomy 13:7-12 (punishment of solicitors of idolatry); id. at 21:18-21 (punish-
ment of stubborn and rebellious son); id. at 17:8-13 (requiring obedience to judges and stating 
that "all the people shall hear, and fear"); id. at 19:16-20 (punishing perjury and stating that 
"those that remain shall hear, and fear, and shall henceforth commit no more any such evil in the 
midst of thee"). These translations are from the Soncino Press edition of the Old Testament, 
entitled THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS (J.H. Hertz ed., 2d ed. 1960). 
63. If a defendant's act constituted a violation of two separate laws, he was generally pun-
ished only for the greater offense. See discussion of multiple punishments in BABYLONIAN T AL-
MUD, KETHUBOTH 30a-35b (I. Epstein ed., 1971). 
64. See COHN, supra note 59, at 212-14. 
65. The warning requirement, see infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text, together with the 
Talmudic rule that no act is punishable unless it is expressly stated in the Bible, gave the suspect 
notice that his acts were criminal and served as a safeguard against retrospective criminal legisla-
tion. See COHN, supra note 59, at 210, 226-29. 
66. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (stating that "[p]roscriptions 
against [homosexual] conduct have ancient roots," and citing Survey on the Constitutional Right 
to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 525 (1986), which in 
turn notes the absolute Mosaic prohibition against homosexuality); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
160 & n.57 (1973) (the view that life does not begin until live birth "appears to be the predomi-
nant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 458 n.27 (1966) (stating that "[t]hirteenth century commentators found an analogue to the 
privilege grounded in the Bible," and citing Maimonides). 
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law does so based on philosophical concern with fairness and govern-
ment oppression. Given these lines of convergence, that the two sys-
tems may approach the problem of criminal wrongdoing from 
somewhat different angles does not preclude meaningful comparison 
of the Jewish and American views on factual and legal guilt. 
Notwithstanding its emphasis on procedure, Jewish law is deeply 
concerned with factual guilt, so much so that it is absolutely clear that 
only the guilty (with one narrow exception67) can be convicted. Con-
viction requires the testimony of two68 competent witnesses. 69 The ac-
cused must be warned that his act will constitute an offense, 70 and he 
must acknowledge that warning. 71 The defendant must then commit 
the entire offense in the sight of the two witnesses. Circumstantial 
evidence, no matter how strong, cannot establish guilt. 72 The defend-
67. An innocent person can be convicted only if the prosecution witnesses lie and are not 
found out in the course of the proceeding, despite vigorous admonitions and cross-examination. 
See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. If, however, additional witnesses refute the testi-
mony of the original witnesses, the defendant cannot be convicted. Such refutation can occur in 
two ways. The second set of witnesses can either dispute the facts of the crime ("contradicting 
witnesses") or can testify that the first set of witnesses was with them elsewhere at the time of the 
offense and thus could not have seen the event in controversy ("plotting witnesses"), In the first 
situation the court simply rejects both sets of testimony, because it cannot determine which was 
truthful. In the latter situation, if the court has rendered its verdict but not yet carried out the 
sentence, the first set of witnesses will suffer the same fate that they had plotted to have inflicted 
on the defendant. If the discovery of the plotting witnesses is either too early or too late, they are 
not punished by the court. See ARTSCROLL MISHNAH SERIES, SEDER NEZIKIN, VOL. II(n), 
TRACTATE MAKKOS 1:4, at 19-20 (Avrohom Y. Rosenberg trans., 19S7) [hereinafter MISHNAH 
MAKKOS]. For explanations concerning why the witnesses are punished only after judgment but 
before imposition of the sentence on the defendant victim, and concerning the differences be· 
tween contradicting and plotting witnesses, see YEHUDA NACHSHONI, 5 STUDIES IN THE 
WEEKLY PARASHAH 1302-10 (Shmuel Himelstein trans., 1989). 
The Mishnah, a basic codification of Jewish law, was redacted in approximately 200 C.E. See 
A. COHEN, EVERYMAN'S TALMUD xxi-xxx (1949) (introduction by Boaz Cohen), describing the 
Mishnah and its origins. 
6S. See Deuteronomy 19:15, 17:6; cf Numbers 35:30. 
69. See ARTSCROLL MISHNAH SERIES, SEDER NEZIKIN, VOL. Il(A), TRACTATE SANHE· 
ORIN 3:1, 3:3-3:5, at 41-43, 47-54 (Matis Roberts trans., 19S7) [hereinafter MISHNAH SANHE· 
ORIN] (describing the categories of persons who are disqualified from testifying in criminal 
cases). 
70. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN SOb (1. Epstein ed., 1960) [hereinafter BADYLO· 
NIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN]; THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, BOOK XIV, THE BOOK OF JUDGES, 
SANHEDRIN 12:2, at 34 (Abraham M. Hershman trans., 1949) [hereinafter THE CODE OF MAI· 
MONIDES] ("How is he warned? He is told: 'Abstain, or Refrain, from doing it, for this is a 
transgression carrying with it a death penalty,' or, 'the penalty of flagellation.' "). 
Scholars dispute whether the warning must be given by the witnesses themselves. The pre-
vailing view is that others may also do so. MISHNAH MAKKOS, supra note 67, 1:9, at 32. 
71. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN, supra note 70, at Sib ("Ifhe [the transgressor] 
was warned [of his liability to flagellation], but remained silent, or ... nodded his head, -the 
first and second time he is to be warned, but on the third occasion he is placed in a cell.'') 
(alteration in original); see also MOSES JUNG, THE JEWISH LAW OF THEFT 21-23 (1929) (defend-
ant's acceptance of the warning established his mens rea). 
72. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN, supra note 70, at 37a-37b. Responding to the 
Mishnah's admonition against conjecturing by witnesses, the Talmud gives this illustration: 
"Perhaps ye saw him running after his fellow into a ruin, ye pursued him, and found him sword 
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ant cannot be one of the witnesses: confessions, even if completely 
voluntary and rendered in court, are inadmissible, and judicial tribu-
nals do not accept guilty pleas. 73 The court is required to admonish 
the witnesses as to the seriousness of their testimony,74 and then inter-
rogate each witness separately75 and intensively.76 Contradictions in 
testimony even about nonessential facts may result in disqualification 
of the witnesses. 11 
Even after conviction, as the defendant is being taken to the execu-
tion site, Jewish law requires that official criers go ahead of the proces-
sion, announcing the identity of the condemned, the nature of the 
crime, the date and time thereof, and the names of the witnesses, and 
asking anyone who knows any grounds for acquittal to come for-
ward. 78 The defendant himself can suspend the execution if he says 
that he can plead something in his favor.79 An erroneous acquittal, on 
the other hand, generally cannot be reversed. so Although Jewish law 
does not require a unanimous verdict, instead mandating only a major-
ity of two in the twenty-three judge court, 81 the emphasis on searching 
out any conceivable possibility of innocence, as well as the law's exten-
sive safeguards, give extraordinary protection to the accused. 
Many of the evidentiary and procedural rules in Jewish law can be 
explained on reliability grounds. Yet some are so attenuated from that 
in hand with blood dripping from it, whilst the murdered man was writhing [in agony]: If this is 
what ye saw, ye saw nothing." (alteration in original). 
73. See AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 114-15 (1970). 
74. See MISHNAH SANHEDRIN, supra note 69, 4:5, at 71-77, The admonition was designed to 
frighten prospective witnesses into giving only true and accurate testimony. 
75. See id. 5:4, at 85. 
76. See id. 5:1-5:3, at 77-85. "Whoever expands the interrogations is praiseworthy. It [once] 
happened that Ben Zakkai interrogated concerning the stems of figs." Id. 5:2, at 79-81 (altera-
tion in original). Ben Zakkai questioned witnesses to a murder that took place under a fig tree, 
asking them whether the stems were thick or thin. Id. at 80. 
77. See id. 5:3, at 81-85; THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, supra note 70, Evidence 2:1-2:5, at 84-
85. 
78. MISHNAH SANHEDRIN, supra note 69, 6:1, at 92-93. If any person comes forward with 
new facts or arguments, or if one of the judges has a new theory for acquittal, the case must be 
reconsidered. Id. at 92-93. 
79. Id. The Mishnah states: "Even if [the defendant] says, 'I have grounds for my own 
acquittal,' they return him, even four or five times, as long as there is substance to his words." 
The requirement of "substance" is not applicable the first two times that the defendant speaks 
out because he may be so fearful that he cannot express himself coherently. Id. 
80. Id. 4:1, at 63-65. The judges may invalidate an erroneous verdict of innocence only if 
they have overlooked an explicit law in the Torah. Id. at 64. 
81. See id. 1 :6, at 23-25, requiring a two-judge majority for conviction by a court of twenty-
three. The decision to acquit, on the other hand, requires only a majority of one. Id. 1:6 at 25. 
See also infra note 115 for the argument that unanimous guilty verdicts may result from defective 
factfinding. 
Capital cases were tried by a 23-judge court, see id. 1:4, at 17-18. The sages debated whether 
offenses punishable by flogging were heard by three-judge or 23-judge courts. Id. 1:2, at 8-9. 
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concern that they appear to be unrelated to guilt; as a result, authori-
ties view them as divine decrees. 82 Whatever the reason for these limi-
tations, which no doubt prevent conviction of the factually guilty,83 
distrust of human courts is clearly implicated. It was understood and 
accepted that the slack would be taken up by higher authority.84 
The Jewish law relating to criminal punishment consequently 
presents an ostensible contradiction. The rules are so strict that they 
assure conviction of only the factually guilty, and at the same time the 
very same rules make it almost impossible to convict even the factually 
guilty.85 Thus, the preoccupation with factual guilt resulted in an ex-
tremely elaborate system of legal guilt. 
Coming from this background, we view the restrictions embodied 
in the Bill of Rights as rather tepid. Miranda does, after all, pale be-
side an absolute prohibition against confessions.86 Over the ages Jew-
82. For example, the Jewish rule against admissibility of confessions is only tenuously related 
to reliability concerns, since even obviously voluntary, in·court confessions were excluded. Thus, 
while Maimonides conjectured that confessions were barred because mentally ill persons might 
accuse themselves falsely, he ultimately concluded that the prohibition was a divine decree be· 
yond human comprehension. See THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, supra note 70, Sanhedrin 18:6, at 
52-53. 
83. A famous Mishnaic debate concerns whether the so-called "Bloody Sanhedrin" executed 
one defendant during a seven-year period or a 70-year period. In this connection, Rabbis Tarfon 
and Akiva stated that, had they been on the court, there would have been no executions. Com· 
mentators suggest that these rabbis would have been able to raise doubts as to the defendant's 
guilt by skillful cross-examination. For example, a person who has a life expectancy of less than 
12 months is called a treifah and is deemed legally dead for many purposes, including being the 
victim of a homicide. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva "would suggest that perhaps there was a 
hole in the place where the sword was thrust, and the murdered man was, in reality, a treifah." 
MISHNAH MAKKOS, supra note 67, 1:10, at 35-36. 
84. This view is epitomized in a Talmudic discussion in tractate Makkos on the meaning of a 
Biblical verse: 
What is this verse talking about? About two people - each of whom killed a person. One 
killed inadvertently and one killed intentionally. This one has no witnesses to testify against 
him, and this one has no witnesses. Since neither event was witnessed, the unintentional 
killer was not exiled and the intentional killer was not executed. The Holy One, Blessed is 
He, summons them to the same inn, where the one who killed intentionally sits under a 
ladder, while the one who killed inadvertently descends the ladder and falls upon him and 
kills him. The result of this chain of events is that the one who had killed intentionally is 
killed, as he deserved, and the one who had previously killed inadvertently is exiled, since he 
has now killed inadvertently in the view of witnesses. 
TALMUD BAVLI, TRACTATE MAKKOS !Ob (Hersh Goldwurm & Nosson Scherman eds., Art· 
Scroll Series 1st ed. 1990). Moreover, if the court was unable to convict a murderer, he remained 
subject to the vengeance of the victim's relatives. See id. at Introduction to Chapter Two. 
85. Given such stringency, some commentators have argued that these rules were simply 
ideals that were never actually applied. See, e.g., GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH 
LAW 165-66 (1953). But see, e.g., AARON M. SCHREIBER, JEWISH LAW AND DECISION-MAK· 
ING 278 (1979) ("It is difficult to maintain that talmudic criminal law was ideal only, since a 
tremendous amount of discussion in the Talmud is devoted to very detailed discussions of these 
norms. Furthermore, some of the incidents recorded in the Talmud purport to report the appli· 
cation in practice of these rules."). 
86. Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against 
Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955, 1041-46 (1988). 
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ish law authorities were not unaware of the extreme nature of some of 
these requirements and, when necessary and possible, they applied ex-
ceptions, particularly in eras in which crime flourished. 87 Nonethe-
less, these safeguards constitute normative Jewish law, just as the 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights are normative law in this country. 
The MaHaRaL, 88 a highly individualistic sixteenth-century philos-
opher, mathematician, and commentator who was Chief Rabbi of 
Prague, 89 "a brilliant thinker and one of the most renowned scholars 
in medieval Jewry,"90 undertook to answer the seven most difficult 
types of challenges that skeptics raised concerning rabbinic Judaism.91 
In this connection he considered a prohibition against unanimous ver-
icts, which in tum led him to discuss a rabbinic law providing that a 
court may not adjudge the defendant guilty without reflecting on the 
evidence overnight. 92 If it fails to do so, the defendant goes free. The 
paradox is quite compelling. Envision a situation where the evidence 
is so strong, so overwhelming that the court does not feel the need to 
deliberate until the next day. The judges are so convinced of the de-
fendant's guilt that they enter a judgment of conviction on the same 
day that they hear the testimony. And in just such a case, where the 
evidence of guilt appears indisputable, Jewish law frees the suspect on 
the basis of an apparent technicality. On the other hand, in a case 
where the evidence is weaker, so that the judges feel the need to con-
87. The primary exception was for emergency situations, when general lawlessness was prev-
alent. See EMANUEL B. QUINT & NEIL s. HECHT, JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE: ITS SOURCES AND 
MODERN APPLICATIONS 139-213 (1980). The rights of certain habitual offenders also were cur-
tailed. See MISHNAH SANHEDRIN, supra note 69, 9:5, at 165-66. 
88. MaHaRaL is a Hebrew language acronym whose letters stand for our teacher Rabbi 
Loew. The MaHaRaL's actual name was Judah Loew ben Bezalel. 
89. See 10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 374-79 (1972). 
90. BEN ZION BOKSER, FROM THE WORLD OF THE CABBALAH: THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
RABBI JUDAH LoEW OF PRAGUE 17 (1954); see also Yitzchok Adlerstein, Unraveling the Mys-
tery: The Power and Elegance of Aggada According to MaHaRaL, JEWISH ACTION, Summer 
1991, at 31 ("[The MaHaRaL's] works are one of the most important resources in making the 
words of our Sages come alive."). 
91. The work, SEFER BE'ER HA-GOLAR (Prague 1598), is not translated into English. 
92. See MISHNAH SANHEDRIN, supra note 69, 4:1, 5:5, at 63-66, 86-87 (explaining the over-
night deliberation requirement). The Talmudic Sages also decided that if a court rendered a 
unanimous guilty verdict, the defendant must be acquitted. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHE-
DRIN, supra note 70, at 17a, 115a, in which Rabbi Kahana gives the overnight deliberation rule 
as a reason for the unanimity-acquittal provision. He suggests that the purpose of overnight 
reflection is to give judges supporting acquittal an opportunity to convince judges favoring con-
viction to change their minds. If, however, the members of the court unanimously favor convic-
tion, the overnight deliberation requirement would be rendered ineffective, because no judges 
would be available to persuade those in favor of guilt that they are in error. Because of the 
interrelationship of the overnight deliberation and nonunanimity requirements, the MaHaRaL's 
arguments in support of the former support the latter as well. See infra notes 93-102, 115 and 
accompanying text. 
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template their decision overnight before rendering a guilty verdict, the 
suspect is convicted. Why such disparate results? 
The MaHaRaL gave two related reasons for this law. He claimed 
that the failure of the court to retire before rendering a guilty verdict 
showed an impairment in the factfinding process.93 A verdict depends 
on consideration of factual details that are necessarily incomplete and 
unclear. Man, who is limited because he is of the physical world, must 
think hard about the details and explore the issue deeply because that 
is the only way he can determine culpability. A judge who does not 
find at least some merit in the defendant's case and who instead votes 
immediately for guilt is not truly deliberating and using that part of 
his intellect necessary to make such a judgment. An intuitive belief 
that the accused is guilty is not enough to do justice. God can imme-
diately discern absolute truth and distinguish between good and evil 
and their gradations, but humans cannot. In effect, the law demands a 
differentiation between the quality of God's omniscient justice and the 
fragile, fallible justice of the worldly courts. Therefore, when a court 
issues a verdict without deliberating overnight, it is failing to acknowl-
edge that critical distinction between divine and human justice.94 
The MaHaRaL's alternate explanation goes beyond the reliability 
concerns underlying his first reason. He argues that the function of a 
worldly court is not to do justice, but to be righteous, which, accord-
ing to the MaHaRaL, means finding evidence of innocence rather than 
guilt.95 Justice is of such transcending importance that we demand 
perfection in its pursuit. Perfection, however, can come only from 
God. Because no human court can do what God does, the Jewish 
court does not claim that it can get to the bottom of the matter and 
discern factual guilt. Rather, Jewish law embodies a more limited 
conception of the function of the courts, which is not to determine the 
absolute truth, but simply to lift the cloud of guilt from the accused. 
In the course of that process, it may be that sometimes the evidence is 
so overwhelming that the cloud of guilt cannot be lifted so the defend-
ant must be found guilty. That, however, is simply incidental, and the 
judgment of guilt is entered so as not to pervert justice. But the 
court's main function is to find the defendant innocent.96 
93. See MAHAR.AL, SEFER BE'ER HA·GOLAH 26 (L. Honig & Sons ed., 1960). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 26-27. 
96. Rabbi Yitzchok Adlerstein of the Yeshiva of Los Angeles, himself a MaHaRaL devotee 
(see supra note 90), offers a possible explanation of the MaHaRaL's second rationale, which is 
based in tum on a commentary by Rabbi Yitzchok Hutner, an important contemporary author-
ity on the sixteenth-century sage. When the MaHaRaL emphasizes that the essential function of 
the court is to find merit and that it adjudicates guilt only incidentally as a necessary byproduct 
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When a court makes an immediate determination of guilt, it is no 
longer considering the possibility of innocence, and the judges are thus 
no longer acting in a righteous way. When this occurs, the court is 
deemed to be improperly constituted, the judicial proceeding conse-
quently is rendered void ab initio, and the defendant is set free. 97 
Stated another way, when a court does not do its job of searching for 
innocence, it is simply not acting as a court. The underlying assump-
tion is that ultimately God will deal appropriately with all who are 
guilty, and thus the human courts should not be so concerned about 
punishing those who have committed a wrong. The court should, in a 
manner of speaking, stick to its business of finding merit in the defend-
ant's cause.98 
The MaHaRaL's first argument in support of the overnight delib-
eration requirement, grounded primarily on reliability concerns, is 
quite traditional.99 His second explanation, based as it is on the notion 
that a court's function is to search out the defendant's merit, is truly 
remarkable and may be viewed as adopting the functional equivalent 
of either a substantive presumption of innocence or a heightened rea-
sonable doubt standard.100 
In the course of his commentary, the MaHaRaL addresses the con-
of this process, he may be applying the philosophical notion that God seeks primarily to find 
merit in this world, but, to do so, guilt must trail behind it as a necessary adjunct. That is, the 
reason that there is a concept of judgment is only to serve the notion of merit. Awards of merit 
for doing good deeds through the exercise of free will cannot exist in the absence of accountabil-
ity. God will therefore confirm merit only ifthe idea of judgment for wrongdoing is also present, 
thus giving reality to the choices that individuals make. In a free will context, reward cannot 
exist in the absence of punishment. Nonetheless, punishment is ancillary to reward. Likewise, in 
an imitation of God, the Jewish court seeks to find merit and punishes the guilty only inciden-
tally. Telephone conversation between the authors and Rabbi Adlerstein on Oct. 11, 1991. 
97. See MAHARAL, supra note 93, at 26-27. 
98. Id. at 26. Rashi, who lived in the eleventh century and who is perhaps the foremost 
commentator on the Bible and the Talmud, expressed this same notion in his commentary to 
Exodus 23:7. In explaining the verse "For I will not justify the wicked," Rashi states: "It is not 
(incumbent) upon you to [find him guilty], for I shall not justify him in My court. Ifhe has gone 
forth from your hand acquitted, I have many messengers to slay him with the death of which he 
is guilty .... " 2 THE PENTATEUCH AND RAsHI'S COMMENTARY 271 (Abraham Ben Isaiah & 
Benjamin Sharfman trans., 1949) [hereinafter RAsHI's COMMENTARY]; see also supra note 84 
and accompanying text. 
99. For example, Maimonides describes the overnight deliberation process as follows: 
[T]he judges meet in pairs to study the case, eat but little and drink no wine at all; all night 
each judge discusses the case with his colleague or deliberates upon it by himself. The fol-
lowing day, early in the morning, they come to court. 
THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, supra note 70, 12:3, at 35. 
100. The MaHaRaL's position can be viewed in this way not because he considered that 
Jewish law assumes the defendant's innocence, but on the basis of the MaHaRaL's understanding 
that the legal process has a limited goal, namely, to clear the names of those who are innocent. 
Rashi observed that the overnight deliberation rule was designed to give the court one last 
chance to find a basis for declaring the defendant innocent. See MISHNAH SANHEDRIN, supra 
note 69, at 66. His position can be interpreted as based either on reliability concerns or on a view 
similar to the MaHaRaL's alternate explanation. 
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tention that enforcement of such stringent procedural requirements al-
lows the guilty to go free. 101 He responds that preserving the court's 
role as a righteous court that seeks to free the innocent is more impor-
tant than the incidental fact of the defendant's factual guilt. That we 
sometimes free guilty people is not significant. What is critical is pre-
serving the character of the court. 102 
Thus, as to Judge Friendly's question whether innocence is irrele-
vant, the MaHaRaL presumably would agree that it certainly is not. 
In fact, in the MaHaRaL's view, innocence is central in a criminal 
justice process in which the court's raison d'etre is to remove the taint 
of guilt from the accused whenever possible. With a difference in de-
gree, the MaHaRaL's position is echoed by American courts, which 
also are quite concerned that no innocent person be convicted. 103 
The MaHaRaL might add, however, that perhaps the question 
Judge Friendly really was asking in 1970, and the question that the 
Rehnquist Court is asking today, is a slightly different one, namely, is 
factual guilt irrelevant? To be sure, Judge Friendly was solicitous of 
"those few" habeas applicants in whose cases "injustice may have been 
done," but his real concern was with regard to the "great multitude of 
applications not deserving [the court's] attention" because the peti-
tioners are "steeped in guilt."104 
To Judge Friendly's reformulated question the MaHaRaL would 
answer, contrary to Judge Friendly, that factual guilt is irrelevant, be-
cause preserving the function of the court is more important than con-
victing the guilty. Judge Friendly might suggest that there is really no 
disagreement, giving a two-pronged apples-and-oranges rebuttal: 
(1) that the purpose of the overnight deliberation requirement is to 
assure reliable verdicts, whereas he, Henry Friendly, sought to prevent 
the application of rules that deflect accurate factfinding, and (2) that 
the Jewish law deals with the judicial process itself, whereas Mapp and 
Miranda, the focus of the Friendly article, relate to law enforcement 
activities outside the courtroom. In effect, Judge Friendly would be 
101. See Rashi's commentary to Exodus 23:7 ("[T]he righteous slay thou not."). Rashi 
states: "And this man is righteous since he was acquitted in court." RASHl'S COMMENTARY, 
supra note 98, at 271. 
102. MaHaRaL, supra note 93, at 27. 
103. Although innocence by itself is not generally a basis for post-conviction relief, that con· 
cern is subsumed under due process rules relating to sufficiency of the evidence, perjured testi-
mony, and suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant. See, e.g., Ex parte Adams, 768 
S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (granting relief in the "thin blue line" case to defendant who 
claimed innocence). 
104. Friendly, supra note 3, at 150; see also id. at 148 n.25, suggesting that most habeas 
petitioners are "black with guilt." Much of Judge Friendly's article treats nonguilt-related 
claims as an impediment to conviction of the guilty. 
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arguing that the overnight deliberation rule falls within his first excep-
tion to the innocence requirement as a challenge to the "very basis of 
the criminal process."tos 
To Judge Friendly's first point, the MaHaRaL might answer that 
what is involved is a question of degree rather than kind. While it is 
true that the overnight deliberation requirement may help to assure 
reliability by encouraging more thorough consideration of the merits 
of each case, 106 the more immediate effect of the rule may be to compel 
the court to set free a person about whose guilt the judges were so 
certain that they neglected to continue the deliberation process over-
night. Moreover, the second basis the MaHaRaL offered for freeing 
the accused when the judges violate the rule goes beyond reliability; it 
is that the court, by its failure to search for innocence, is not fulfilling 
its role as a court. To assure proper judicial functioning, Jewish law 
requires the release of the accused, even though in a particular case the 
defendant was factually guilty and therefore a judgment of conviction 
would have been perfectly reliable. 
The MaHaRaL even might argue that this value - the proper 
functioning of the court - is being protected by a prophylactic rule 
that is not that different from the prophylactic rules of Mapp and Mi-
randa, except that it is one designed for judges rather than law en-
forcement officials. Just as the American exclusionary rules are 
intended to prevent unconstitutional police conduct, release of the 
guilty defendant acts to deter judges from violating Jewish law by ren-
dering a decision without waiting until the next day. 107 
In response to the second prong of Judge Friendly's argument, the 
MaHaRaL would of course have to acknowledge that the overnight 
105. See supra note 5. Judge Friendly might also contend that because the overnight deliber-
ation rule assured reliability in the factfinding process, it would be held retroactive and thus 
would fall within his fourth exception to the innocence requirement. See supra note 5. 
While it is true that Judge Friendly could pretermit this entire fanciful dialogue with the 
MaHaRaL by simply pointing out that his article deals only with collateral review, see supra note 
18, whereas the MaHaRaL discusses the criminal trial itself, we nonetheless consider it reason-
able to discuss the distinctions made in the text because Judge Friendly opposed the fulsome 
application of Mapp and Miranda, the betes noires of his article, on direct review as well. See 
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, The Bil/ of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, in BENCHMARKS 235, 
247-65 (1967). 
106. On the other hand, although both Mapp and Miranda may exclude reliable evidence of 
guilt, enforcement of the Miranda rule may also prevent police coercion that can lead to unrelia-
ble confessions. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470. In addition, the Miranda Court noted that custodial 
interrogation "subject[s] large numbers of innocent persons to detention and interrogation." 384 
U.S. at 482. 
107. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984) (prophylactic exclusionary rule 
inapplicable in cases of good faith reliance on defective warrants, because, inter alia, it will not 
"in any way reduce judicial officers' professional incentives to comply with the Fourth Amend-
ment, encourage them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting of all colorable warrant 
requests" (footnote omitted)). 
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deliberation requirement relates to the judicial process, whereas the 
exclusionary rules on which Judge Friendly focused deal with police 
activity outside the courtroom. The MaHaRaL might point out, how-
ever, that although illegal police methods in obtaining evidence work a 
wrong at the time the seizure occurs, such misconduct works a further 
wrong when the illegally secured evidence is introduced at trial. 108 
The use of this evidence implicates judicial integrity, which, like the 
overnight deliberation rule, is an aspect of the proper functioning of 
the court. In fact, the Mapp majority embraced the judicial integrity 
concept as an alternative basis for its decision, 109 although admittedly 
this rationale has since fallen on hard times110 and has been dismissed 
in favor of the more malleable deterrence argument. 111 The Miranda 
exclusionary rule also involves the judicial process: the requirement of 
warnings conserves judicial resources by eliminating the need to deter-
mine voluntariness on a case-by-case, totality of the circumstances ba-
sis, and also facilitates more accurate factfinding with respect to the 
voluntariness of admissions.112 
So while the overnight deliberation rule is at least partially bound 
up with the question of reliability and relates to the judicial process 
itself, the broader and more fundamental issue raised by this law is 
whether we should free the guilty to preserve a value that we deem 
necessary to proper working of the criminal justice process, regardless 
of the culpability of individual defendants. To this Judge Friendly's 
answer is generally no, 113 and the MaHaRaL's is yes. For in our im-
108. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 933 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Because seizures are executed 
principally to secure evidence, and because such evidence generally has utility in our legal system 
only in the context of a trial supervised by a judge, it is apparent that the admission of illegally 
obtained evidence implicates the same constitutional concerns as the initial seizure of that 
evidence."). 
109. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) ("Our decision ..• gives ••• to the courts[] 
that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice."). 
110. See, for example, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976), in which the Court con· 
eluded that the judicial integrity concern "has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of 
highly probative evidence" (footnote omitted). 
111. See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352 (1987) (discussing "whether exclusion of 
evidence seized pursuant to a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional will 'have a signifi· 
cant deterrent effect' on legislators enacting such statutes," and finding no such effect (citation 
omitted)); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457-58 (1976) ("Working, as we must, with the 
absence of convincing empirical data, common sense dictates that the deterrent effect of the 
exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the 'punishment' imposed upon the 
offending criminal enforcement officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or 
against a different sovereign."); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974) ("Whatever 
deterrence of police misconduct may result from the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from 
criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand jury proceedings 
would significantly further that goal."). 
112. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966). 
113. See supra note 5. 
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perfect world there is only one kind of ascertainable guilt, and that is 
legal guilt. 114 The search for more is nothing less than arrogance. 115 
114. Jewish law's emphasis on legal guilt has a downside, however. If a conviction is ob-
tained in compliance with all procedural and evidentiary requirements, it cannot be set aside 
even on the basis of innocence. Witnesses are not permitted to recant their testimony. See BAB-
YLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN, supra note 70, at 44b; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, MAKKOTH 3a 
(I. Epstein ed., 1987); BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KETHUBOTH 18b (I. Epstein ed., 1971). This is 
illustrated by a Rashi commentary to the Jerusalem Talmud that tells of the son of Rabbi 
Shimon ben Shetach. The enemies of Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach hired false witnesses to concoct 
testimony that his son had murdered someone. After the son's conviction, the witnesses publicly 
recanted. The son refused to permit his father to save him, calling out to the judges who had 
convicted him: "Fulfill the sentence on me rather than transgress the Torah-law which states 
that the witnesses cannot revoke their testimony!" The execution proceeded. 2 MOSHE WEISS-
MAN, THE MIDRASH SAYS 218 (1980). While this result is harsh, it does demonstrate the respect 
that Jewish law gives to the concept oflegal guilt. By comparison, it is difficult but not impossi-
ble to reopen American convictions on the basis of recanted testimony. See, e.g., United States v. 
Mazzanti, 925 F.2d 1026 (7th Cir. 1991) (using the lenient test that jury might have reached a 
different conclusion absent the false testimony, and discussing stricter tests used in other circuits, 
such as probability that the false testimony would lead to acquittal on retrial, and requirement 
that conviction be based substantially on tainted evidence). 
115. The related rule requiring acquittal in the case of a unanimous guilty verdict, see supra 
note 92 and accompanying text, also supports the view that in any conflict between legal and 
factual guilt, the former must prevail. Like the overnight deliberation requirement, the unanim-
ity-acquittal rule appears to be a counterintuitive mandate, because unanimity might be consid-
ered a guarantor of correctness. Cf. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding 
nonunanimousjury verdicts in state criminal cases). Unanimity, however, arguably impinges on 
reliability, because judges speaking only in one voice may have failed to consider the issues 
deeply and, in the alternative, may not have fulfilled the function of the court to look for right-
eousness on the part of the accused. 
